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COMMENTS
STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO INSPECT CORPORATE BOOKS AND
RECORDS
A stockholder of a private corporation has a common law right, for
proper purposes and under reasonable regulations as to time and place,
to inspect any one or all of the books and records of the corporation
of which he is a member.' It is similar to the right of a member of
an ordinary partnership to examine the books and records of the
partnership, 2 except that the right of a partner is absolute.
This right is said to rest upon the proposition that the stockholders
are the real owners of the corporation's assets and property.3  The
interest of a stockholder in corporate property has been called a bene-
ficial interest,4 an equitable ownership5 or a quasi ownership., These
propositions are neither strictly accurate nor necessary. The legal
title to the property is in the corporation, a separate and distinct
legal entity. The stockholders are not the equitable owners of the
property, yet they ultimately take the benefit from it. Therefore it
is just and proper that they should have full means of knowing what
is going on. This is the basis of the right of inspection. The right
is a right of a stockholder as stockholder and not as an organ of the
corporation. It is incident to and arises from the legal relation of
stockholder and corporation.
The common law right has never been superseded and is frequently
affirmed by constitutional T and statutory8 provisions. Such statutes
are usually held to be merely declaratory of the common law right 9
or to enlarge such right.','
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433;
In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 N. E. 1103, 45 L. R. A. 461; Klotz U.
Pan American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N. E. 764.
2 Guhtrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433;
Commonwealth v. Phoenix Iron Co., 105 Pa. St. 111, 51 Am. Rep. 184.
3 Guhtrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433;
Klotz v. Pan American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N. E. 764; Cincnnamti
Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 48 L. R. A. 732, 78 Am. St.
Rep. 707, 56 N. E. 1033.
4Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 Pac. 729.
5 Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 10 Ann. Cas. 989, 80 N. E. 524.
* State v. Whited & Wheless, 104 La. 125, 28 So. 922.
7 California Const. Art. 12, §14; Louisiana Const. 1879, Art. 245 (Const.
1898, Art. 273).
8 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433;
In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 N. E. 1103, 45 L. R. A. 461.
9 O'Hara v. National Biscuit Co., 60 N. J. L. 198, 54 AtI. 241.
1O Pfirman v. Success Mining Co., Ltd., 30 Idaho 468, 166 Pac. 216; John-
son v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 Pac. 1050.
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All stockholders have the right of inspection, regardless of the
amount of stock held," but some statutes provide that the applicant
shall hold or represent a certain amount of stock or shall have been
a stockholder of record for a certain period of time' 2  Such statutes
are not common.
The stockholder's right of inspection belongs to stockholders and
to the personal representatives of deceased stockholders. 3 In making
the inspection the stockholder is not confined to personal efforts. He
may exercise the right through or have the aid of agents, 4 experts,15
accountants, "I stenographers, 7 or attorneys.' If this were not true
the right would be empty and its exercise futile.
The common law right of inspection is qualified by the condition
that it must be asserted for proper purposes and under reasonable
regulations as to time and place. On the question of what is a proper
purpose there is some confusion in the authorities. The English
courts, in the absence of statutory provisions, have held that there
must be a dispute pending between the stockholder and the corpora-
tion, or other stockholders, but they have not required the institu-
tion of suit..' 9 While the English rule has had some following in this
country,20 in some eases it has been expressly repudiated.2' It has
been modified by statute in England. 22  The general tendency of
American courts has been to permit the greatest freedom of inspec-
tion, placing no limit except that the right shall not be exercised for
speculative purposes or to gratify idle curiosity.23 The United States
Supreme Court has held that "the right may not be denied to the
stockholder who seeks the information for legitimate purposes." 24
1 Richmond v. Hi, 148 111. App. 179; In re De Vengoechea, 86 N. J. L.
35, 91 Atl. 341.
12 N. Y. Laws 1916, c.127 amending Consol. Laws, c.59, L.1909, c.61.
13 In re Hastings, 128 App. Div. 516, 112 N. Y. Sup. 800 (aff. 194 N. Y.
546, 87 N. E. 1120).
14 Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 48 L. R. A.
732, 78 Am. St. Rep. 707, 56 N. E. 1033.
'r Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 10 Ann. Cas. 989, 80 N. E. 524.
16 State v. St. Louis Transit Co., 124 Mo. App. 111, 100 S. W. 1126.
17 State v. St. Louis Transit Co., 124 Mo. App. 111, 100 S. W. 1126.
18 State v. Ice, 75 W. Va. 476, 84 S. E. 181.
19 Rex v. Merchant Tailor's Co., 2 B. & Ad. 115, 109 Reprint 1086; In re
Burton, etc., Co., 31 L. J. Q. B. 62.
20 Commonwealth v. Phoenix Iron Co., 105 Pa. 111, 51 Am. Rep. 184;
Lyon -. American Screw Co., 16 R. I. 472, 17 Atl. 61.
21 Foster v. White, 86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88; Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass.
239, 10 Ann. Cas. 989, 80 N. E. 524.
22 St. 8 & 9 Viet. c.16, §117, 119, and St. 25 & 26 Vict. c.89, Table A 78.
23 Gut7rie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433;
Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 10 Ann. Gas. 989, 80 N. B. 524; In re
Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 45 L. R. A. 461, 53 N. E. 1103.
24 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas. 433.
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The great conflict in the American authorities is on the question of
whether the statutory right of inspection is absolute or qualified. The
tendency has been to hold that such statutes make the right absolute.
2 5
Some cases hold that the statutory right is qualified because it is
merely declaratory of the common law26 or because the court still
retains its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus27 in the face
of an unqualified statutory declaration. M~uch of this confusion
would be avoided if the statutes expressly required sufficient grounds
or expressly preserved the discretionary power of the courts.
The only Indiana statute touching inspection deals merely with the
stockbook and provides that the stockbook "shall, at all business
hours of the company, be subject to the inspection of creditors, stock-
holders, or their representatives". 98 Although this statute has been
in force since 1852 it has been before our courts of last resort in only
two cases,2 ' neither one of which dealt with the question of qualifica-
tions of the right of inspection.
The common law right of inspection was before the Indiana Su-
preme Court for the first time in a recent case, in which the court
held, reversing the lower court, that the relatrix, the administratrix
of the estate of her deceased husband who was a stockholder in a
manufacturing corporation, was not entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling the corporation to submit its books of account and books
showing its assets, liabilities and financial condition to examination
by a competent accountant, to be appointed and paid by relatrix. The
purpose, stated by relatrix in making her demand for an inspection,
was to see what the stock was worth in order that she might arrive
at its value for inheritance tax purposes and that she might admin-
ister upon and finally settle the estate. Defendant company did not
refuse to let relatrix, personally, examine the books but did refuse
to let her have them examined by an expert accountant. Charles
25 White v. Mante, 109 Me. 408, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332, 84 At. 890;
Pfirman v. Success Aining Co., Ltd., 30 Idaho 468, 474, 166 Pac. 216;
Powelson v. Tennessee Eastern Electric Co., 220 Mass. 380, 107 N. E. 997,
Ann. Cas. 1917 A. 102; Venner v. Chicago City R. Co., 246 Ill. 170,*92
N. E. 643, 20 Ann. Cas. 607.
20 O'Hara, v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. 198, 54 AtI. 241.
27State ex rel. Thiele v. Cities Service Co., 115 Atl. 773; Shea v. Sweet-
zer, 119 Me. 400, 111 At. 579. See 7 ILL. LAW REV. 155.
23 Burns. Ann. Stat. 1914, §4054; R. S. 1881, §3010; 1 R. S. 1852, §10,
p. 241.
29 Williams v. Gravel Road Co. 45 Ind. 170 (holding, in an action to recover
a penalty for failing to exhibit the stockbook, that it must be alleged that the
officer upon whom the demand was made for inspection knew that the per-
son making the demand was entitled to the inspection); S. F. Bowser &
Co., Inc., et al. '0. State of Indiana, ex rel. Hines, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N. E.
57 (holding, in denying a writ of mandamus, that, where corporate stock
is in fact owned by an employer, although registered in the name of an
agent, the agent is not the real party in interest and is not entitled to in-
spect the stockbook).
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Hegewald Co. v. State ex rel. Hegewald (Sup. Ct. of Ind. Oct. 27,
1925) 149 N. E. 170.
The court's statement that "a writ of mandamus will issue only in
case the facts show a clear, legal right on the part of the relator to
obtain the relief demanded, and a clear, legal duty resting on the
.defendants to do and perform the thing demanded" is sound, but the
application of the rule to the facts is narrow.
The court says that, where the relatrix is not charged with any legal
duty to ascertain the value of her stock for inheritance tax purposes,
but the duty to learn all pertinent facts and fix such value is imposed
by law upon a public officer who has full power to investigate and
examine witnesses, and which would not be bound by any investiga-
tion which the relatrix might make or any conclusion she might reach,
the mere fact that she desires to know such value in order that she
may pay the inheritance tax does not charge the corporation with a
clear legal duty to submit its books to accountants employed on her
behalf and that her desire to inform herself so that she may report
to the court by which she was appointed her conclusion as to the
value of the stock for inheritance tax purposes does not give her a
clear, legal right to demand that the books be submitted to an ac-
countant. Such a conclusion would seem to require that the stock-
holder's right be based on a legal duty to ascertain the facts, a re-
quirement which finds no support in either the English or American
authorities. The personal representative should be in a position to
challenge the valuation made by the tax appraiser, if such valuation
is erroneous. To do this, the personal representative must know the
facts.
The court places no emphasis on the fact that the demand was that
the books be submitted to an accountant instead of to the relatrix.
While this is not material, it affords an opportunity to distinguish
the principal case if the question arises again.
A stockholder, who desires to ascertain the value of his stock with
a view to offering it for sale is entitled to inspection. 0 The desire of
the relatrix in the principal case to ascertain the value of her stock
for inheritance tax purposes would seem to be equally proper. She
did not ask that the right be exercised for speculative purposes or to
gratify idle curiosity. She sought the information for legitimate pur-
poses. The principal case is not in line with the great weight of
American authority. The decision seems narrow and unfortunate.
PAuL V. McNUTT.
30 State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 27 Del. 248, 88 AtI. 449, 24 Del.
379, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290, 77 AtI. 16; Lawshe v. Royal Baking Powder
Co., 54 N. Y. Misc. 220, 104 N. Y. Supp. 361; Garcin v. Trenton Rubber
Mfg. Company, (N. J. L.), 60 AtI. 1098.
